Andrew Haldane

Claire Jones writing for the Financial Times Alphaville column confesses a fondness for the speeches of Andrew Haldane (departing chief economist at the Bank of England) . She offered a selection of favourites (you can access her column by signing up to Alphaville if you are not an FT subscriber).

I also rate pretty much everything he writes as worth reading often more than once to reflect on the issues he raises. To her top three Haldane speeches, I will add one he did in 2016 titled “The Great Divide” which explored the gap between the way banks perceive themselves and how they are perceived by the community.

Tony – From the Outside

The Conversation: “Hostage to fortune: why Westpac could struggle to find the right buyer for its NZ subsidiary”

Another useful contribution to the question of how the Australian banks deal with changes in the capital requirements impacting their NZ subsidiaries.

Their conclusion is that Westpac will struggle to find a buyer at an acceptable price

The Conversation: “Hostage to fortune: why Westpac could struggle to find the right buyer for its NZ subsidiary”

Risk weights, capital and competition in the residential mortgage market

I have posted a couple of time on a Discussion Paper published by The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) in late 2020 (“A more flexible and resilient capital framework for ADIs”) setting out how it proposes to wrap up a number of prior consultations on a variety of aspects of ADI (authorised deposit-taking institution) capital reform in Australia (see here, here and here).

This post looks at the changes to mortgage risk weights (RW) outlined in the paper and attempts to explore (with limited information) what practical impact they might have. The short version is:

  • In very broad terms, APRA is seeking to assign higher RW to residential mortgages it deems to be relatively more risky but also lower RW for those it considers less risky
  • In pursuit of this objective, APRA has proposed two new categories of residential mortgage defined by the loan purpose (i.e. “Owner occupier loans paying principal and interest” and “Other Residential” including loans for investment and all interest only loans upon to 5 years tenor)
  • “Standard residential” mortgages see increased sensitivity of RW to Loan Valuation Ratios (LVR) while “Non-Standard residential mortgages face a 100% RW across the board irrespective of their LVR
  • Increased sensitivity to LVR is achieved via a simple recalibration of RW in the Standardised approach and via a reduction in the minimum Loss Given Default (LGD) applied in the IRB approach
  • The reduced LGD floor also indirectly allows Lenders’ Mortgage Insurance (LMI) to be recognised in the IRB models thereby creating greater alignment with the Standardised approach which directly recognises the value of LMI via a roughly 20% discount in the RW assigned to high LVR loans
  • With respect to the impact of RW on competition, APRA argues both that the existing difference between the Standardised and IRB approach is overstated and that the proposed changes will further assist the Standardised ADIs to compete.

APRA is not tinkering at the margins – there are quite substantial adjustments to RWs for both Standardised and IRB ADIs. That is the short version, read on if you want (or need) to dig into the detail.

Improved risk sensitivity cuts both ways

I have looked at “improved risk sensitivity” part of the overall package previously but, with the benefit of hindsight, possibly focussed too much on the expected reduction in aggregate risk weighted assets (RWA) coupled with the expansion of the capital buffers.

It is true that RWA overall are expected to decline – APRA estimated that the overall impact of the proposed revisions would be to reduce average RWAs for IRB ADIs by 10% and by 7% for Standardised ADIs. This obviously translates into higher reported capital ratios which is the impact I initially focussed on. Risk sensitivity however works both ways and a subsequent reading of the paper highlighted (for me at least) the equally important areas in which RW are proposed to increase – residential mortgages in particular.

APRA’s proposed revised approach to residential mortgage risk

APRA was very clear that one of their overall policy objectives is to “further strengthen capital requirements for residential mortgage exposures to reflect risks posed by ADIs’ structural concentration in this asset class“. In pursuit of this objective, APRA is targeting investment and interest only lending in particular but also high LVR lending in general.

In pursuit of these aims, the existing “standard residential mortgage” category is to be further broken down into 1) “Owner Occupied Principal and Interest” loans (OP&I) and 2) “Other Residential”. The “non-standard residential mortgages category (i.e. loans that do not conform to the credit risk origination standards prescribed by APRA) is to be expanded to include interest only loans with a tenor greater than 5 years.

So we get three broad vertical categories of residential mortgage riskiness

Low RiskHigher risk Highest risk
Owner Occupied
Principal & Interest
– Interest Only (term <5yrs)
– Investor mortgage loans
– Loans to SME secured by residential property
– Interest Only (term >5yrs)
– “Non-standard” mortgages
Note: RW are reduced where loans are covered by LMI but only for Standard Residential Mortgages and only where LVR is above 80%. To be classified as a “standard” mortgage a loan must satisfy minimum enforceability, serviceability and valuation criteria prescribed by APRA.
Impact on the Standardised ADIs

The table below compares the current RWs under the standardised approach (Source: Table 2 of APS 112 – Attachment C) with the indicative RWs APRA has proposed in the December 2020 Discussion Paper (Source: Table 2).

Residential Mortgage Risk Weights – Current and Proposed for Standardised ADIs

The RW within each of the three categories are being substantially recalibrated – APRA is not tinkering at the edges.

  • Increased sensitivity to LVR translates to higher RW applying in the upper LVR range but also reductions in the lower LVR range.
  • The increases in the high LVR ranges are particularly marked in the new “Other Residential” category (30-40% increases) but the reductions in the low LVR range are equally material (14-42%) for the OP&I category
  • Lender’s Mortgage Insurance (LMI) continues to be recognised at the high end of the LVR range (i.e. 80% plus) but the RW assigned to loans with LMI are higher than is currently applied.
  • In case anyone was wondering how APRA really felt about non-standard residential mortgages they receive a 100% RW irrespective of their LVR.
Risk weights under the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) Approach

It is a lot harder to figure out exactly what will happen to IRB RW but the starting point is the two new multipliers being added to the IRB RW formula. The OP&I multiplier adds 40% to RW while the Other Residential category gets a 60% loading. These replace the existing “correlation adjustment” factor that was applied to increase the average IRB RW for residential mortgages to a minimum of 25% as part of the effort to reduce the difference between IRB and Standardised capital requirements.

In aggregate, my guess is that the impacts are roughly neutral in the case of the “Other Residential” loans subject to the 60% loading and a net reduction for the OP&I category. The substitution of flat scalars for the existing correlation adjustment does however create some impacts at the upper and lower ends of the PD scale. Under the correlation approach, my understanding is that low PD exposures increase by proportionately more than the average impact and high PD exposures by less. Under scalar approach, the RW are increased by the same percentage across the PD scale. I am not sure how material the impacts are but mention them for completeness. The flat scalars certainly have the advantage of simplicity and transparency but mostly they establish a RW differential between the two types of standard residential mortgage.

The reduced LGD floor is a significant change because it offers the potential for RW to be halved for exposures that can take the maximum advantage. Consistent with the revised standardised RW, I assume that this will be at the lower end of the LVR range. IRB ADIs will have to work for this benefit however as APRA will first have to approve their LGD models. Some ADIs might be well advanced on this front but as a general rule risk modellers tend to have plenty to do and it is hard to see these models having been a priority while the 20% floor has been in place.

It is also worth noting that the risk differential between OP&I and Other Residential mortgages implied by the multipliers employed in the IRB approach is 14% (i.e. 1.6/1.4) is lower than the 20-30% difference in RW proposed to apply in the Standardised approach. This seems to reflect APRA’s response to comments received (section 4.3 of “Response to Submissions”) that the application of different multipliers could double count risks already captured in the PD and LGD assigned to the two different categories of lending by the IRB risk models.

Impacts, implications and inferences

I can see a couple of implications that follow from these proposed changes

  1. LGD models start to matter
  2. The unquestionably strong benchmark is reinforced
  3. Potential to change the competition equilibrium between the big and small banks
LGD models start to matter

The IRB framework has been a part of the Australian banking system for close to two decades but the 20% LGD Floor has meant that residential mortgage LGD models mostly don’t matter, at least for the purposes of measuring capital adequacy requirements. I am not close enough to the action to know exactly what choices were made in practice but the logical response of credit risk modellers would be to concentrate on models that will make a difference.

APRA’s decision to reduce the LGD floor changes the calculus, IRB ADIs now have an incentive to invest the time and resources required to get new LGD models approved. Loan segments able to take full advantage of the 10% floor will be able to more than offset the impact of the multipliers. The LGD has a linear impact on risk weights so a halving from 20 to 10 percent will see risk weights also halve more than offsetting the 40 to 60% loadings introduced by the multipliers.

Exactly where the cut off lies remains to be seen but it seems reasonable to assume that the increases and decreases proposed in standardised risk weights are a reasonable guide to what we might expect in IRB risk weights; i.e. LGD may start to decline below 20% somewhere around the 70% LVR with the maximum benefit (10% LGD) capping out for LVR of say 50% and below. I have to emphasise that these are just semi educated guesses (hopefully anyway) and I am happy to be corrected by anyone with practical experience in LGD modelling. The main point is that LGD modelling will now have some practical impact so it will be interesting to watch how the IRB ADI respond.

Unquestionably strong is reinforced

On one level, it could be argued that the changes in risk weights don’t matter. ADIs get to report higher capital ratios but nothing really changes in substance. Call me a wide-eyed, risk-capital idealist but I see a different narrative.

First up, we know that residential mortgages are a huge risk concentration for the Australian banks so even small changes can have an impact on their overall risk profiles.

“While an individual residential mortgage loan does not, on its own, pose a systemic risk to the financial system, the accumulation of lending by almost all ADIs in this asset class means that in aggregate the system is exposed to heightened risks”

APRA Discussion Paper, “A more flexible and resilient capiutral framework for ADIs”, 8 December 2020 (page 12)

To my mind, the proposed changes can work in a combination of two ways and both have the potential to make a difference. The decline in residential mortgage risk weights is largely confined to loans originated at low LVRs – less than 70% in the case of “Owner-Occupied Principal and Interest” and less than 60% in the case of “Other Residential”. High LVR risk weights (i.e. 90% plus) are reduced for Owner Occupied Principal and Interest without LMI but my understanding is that these kinds 0f loans are exceptions to the rule, granted to higher quality borrowers and not a large share of the overall exposure. High LVR loans as a rule will face higher risk weights under the proposed changes and materially higher in the case of the “Other Residential” category.

In the low LVR lending, the decline in risk weights seems to be largely offset by higher capital ratio requirements via the increased buffers. In the case of the higher risk, high-LVR lending, the higher capital ratio requirements add to the overall dollar capital requirement.

Competition in residential mortgage lending

APRA has explicitly cited “enhancing competition” as one of their objectives. I don’t have enough hard data to offer any comprehensive assessment of the extent to which competition will be enhanced. The one thing I think worth calling out is the substantial reduction in RW assigned to low LVR loans under the Standardised approach. The table below maps the changes in RW with data APRA publishes quarterly on the amount of loans originated at different LVR bands.

Owner occupiers who have managed to substantially reduce the amount they owe the bank have always been an attractive credit risk; even better if appreciation in the value of their property has further reduced the effective LVR. The proposals reinforce the attraction of this category of borrower. The IRB ADIs will not give up these customers without a fight but the Standardised ADI will have an enhanced capacity t0 compete in this segment via the reduced RW.

At this stage we can only speculate on impacts as the final form of the proposals may evolve further as APRA gets to see the results of the Quantitative Impact Statements that the ADI’s are preparing as part of the consultation process.

Summing up

We are still some way way from seeing the practical impact of these changes and we need to see the extent to which the proposals are refined in response to what APRA learns from the QIS. There does however seem to be potential for the economics of residential mortgage lending to be shaken up so this is a development worth keeping an eye on.

Tony – From the Outside

What Can We Learn from a Big Boat Stuck in a Canal?

Interesting post by Matt Stoller on the broader policy issues associated with the current problem in the Sues Canal.

Here is a short extract capturing the main idea …

“Industrial crashes, in other words, are happening in unpredictable ways throughout the economy, shutting down important production systems in semi-random fashion. Such collapses were relatively rare prior to the 1990s. But industrial crashes were built into the nature of our post-1990s production system, which prioritizes efficiency over resiliency. Just as ships like the Ever Given are bigger and more efficient, they are also far riskier. And this tolerance for risk is a pattern reproducing itself far beyond the shipping industry; we’ve off shored production and then consolidated that production in lots of industries, like semiconductors, pharmaceutical precursors, vitamin C, and even book printing.

What is new isn’t the vulnerability of the Suez Canal as a chokepoint, it’s that we’ve intentionally created lots of other artificial chokepoints. And since our production systems have little fat, these systems are tightly coupled, meaning a shortage in one area cascades throughout the global economy, costing us time, money, and lives.”

Irrespective of whether you agree with the solutions he proposes, I think the point he makes (i.e. the tension between efficiency and resilience and the systemic problem with systems that are “tightly coupled”) is a very real issue. We saw this play out in the financial system in 2008 and we saw it play out in global supply chains in 2020. There are differing views on whether the measures have gone far enough but the financial system has been substantially re-engineered to make it more resilient. It remains to be seen how global supply chains will evolve in response to the problems experienced.

Link to the post here

https://mattstoller.substack.com/p/what-we-can-learn-from-a-big-boat

Tony – From the Outside

Capital adequacy is not always intuitive

I did a short post yesterday scratching the surface of the issues associated with Westpac’s announcement that it is reviewing its options in New Zealand. In this post I will offer a little more background and comment focussed on the impact of Australian capital adequacy requirements.

The backstory thus far is that:

These combined changes obviously impact the economics of an Australian ADI owning a NZ regulated banks but to have any hope of understanding what is going on I believe we first need to define two pieces of Australian ADI capital jargon, Level 1 and Level 2

Level 1 is the ADI itself on a stand alone basis (note that is a simplification but close enough to the truth for the purposes of this post).

Level 2 is defined in APRA’s consultation paper as “The consolidation of the ADI and all its subsidiaries other than non-consolidated subsidiaries; or if the ADI is a subsidiary of a non-operating holding company (NOHC), the consolidation of the immediate parent NOHC and all the immediate parent NOHC’s subsidiaries (including any ADIs and their subsidiaries) other than non-consolidated subsidiaries.”

For completeness I should probably also define “ADI” which is an Authorised Deposit Taking Institution (more colloquially referred to as a bank).

You can be forgiven for not being familiar with the Level 1 – Level 2 distinction but the capital ratios typically quoted in any discussion of Australian ADI capital strength are the Level 2 measures. The Unquestionably Strong benchmark that dominates the discussion is a Level 2 measure. 

Part of the problem with the RBNZ initiative is that the increase in capital required to be held in the NZ part of the Group has no impact on the Level 2 capital ratio that is used to define the “Unquestionably Strong” benchmark the Australian ADI are expected to meet. The RBNZ is of course within its rights to set what ever capital requirement it deems appropriate but APRA then has to ensure that the increase in NZ based capital does not come at the expense of Australian stakeholders.

The Level 2 capital measure tells us nothing about this question. In theory this is where the Level 1 capital adequacy measure comes into play but I have always found the Level 1 measure a bit counter-intuitive.

  • My intuitive expectation is that the Level 1 measure for an Australian ADI should include the capital actually available in Australia and the risk exposures that capital has to underwrite.
  • What actually happens is that the dollar value of the Level 1 capital can be virtually the same as the Level 2 measure even though capital has been deployed in an offshore banking subsidiary (retained earnings in the subsidiary do not count but that can be addressed by paying a divided to the parent and then investing an equivalent amount of capital back in the subsidiary).
  • Level 1 risk weighted assets of the parent only incorporate an allowance for the risk weighted value of the equity invested in the banking subsidiary
  • This adjustment to the Level 1 risk weighted assets will of course be substantially less than the risk weighted assets the subsidiary is supporting with that equity that are excluded from the Level 1 parent capital ratio.
  • As a result, it is mathematically possible for the Level 1 CET1 ratio of the parent entity to be higher than the Level 2 Group ratio even though capital has been deployed outside the parent entity – that seems counter intuitive to me.

The changes that APRA has proposed to introduce will force the Australian banks to hold more capital to offset the impact of the CET1 deduction created when the investment in the banking subsidiary exceeds the (10%) threshold. As I understand it, this deduction only applies to the Level 1 measure so Level 2 capital will, all other things being equal, be higher as a result of responding to the combined impact of the RBNZ and APRA requirements. At face value that looks like stronger capital, which it is for the Group on average (i.e. Level 2), but the Australian parts of the banking Group do not benefit from the increase and it is important to understand that when evaluating the extent to which the Australian part of the banking group continues to be Unquestionably Strong.

APRA’s proposed change addresses the immediate issue created by the RBNZ requirement but I must confess that I still find the Level 1 capital adequacy measure a touch confusing. Level 1 capital ratios calculated on the basis I have set out above do not appear (to me at least) to offer an intuitively logical view of the relative capital strength of the various parts of the banking group.

As always, it is entirely possible that I am missing something here but understanding the technical issues outlined above is I think useful when making sense of the issues that Westpac (and other Australian ADIs) will be considering as they weigh their options in New Zealand. Relying on your intuition expectations of how the two requirements interact may be an unreliable guide if you are not familiar with the technical detail.

Tony – From the Outside

Westpac considers its options in NZ

Westpac today (24 March 2021) announced that it is “… assessing the appropriate structure for its New Zealand business and whether a demerger would be in the best interests of shareholders. Westpac is in the very early stage of this assessment and no decisions have been made.”

There are obviously a lot of moving parts here but one important consideration is the interaction between the substantial increase in capital requirements mandated by the RBNZ and APRA’s proposed change in the way that these investments must be funded by the Australian parent.

The rest of this post offers a short summary of how these investments are currently treated under the Australian capital adequacy standard (APS 111) and APRA’s proposed changes.

As a rule, APRA’s general capital treatment of equity exposures requires that they be fully deducted from CET1 Capital in order to avoid double counting of capital. The existing rules (APS 111) however provides a long-standing variation to this general rule when measuring Level 1 capital adequacy. This variation allows an ADI at Level 1 to risk weight (after first deducting any intangibles component) its equity investments in banking and insurance subsidiaries. The risk weight is 300 percent if the subsidiary is listed or 400 per cent if it is unlisted.

APRA recognises that this improves the L1 ratios by around 100bp versus what would be the case if a full CET1 deduction were applied but was comfortable with that outcome based on exposure levels that preceded the RBNZ change in policy.

The RBNZ’s move towards higher CET1 requirements however undermines this status quo and potentially sees a greater share of the overall pool of equity in the group migrate from Australia to NZ. APRA recognises of course that the RBNZ can do whatever it deems best for NZ depositors but APRA equally has to ensure that the NZ benefits do not come at the expense of Australian depositors (and other creditors).

To address this issue, APRA has proposed to amend APS 111 to limit the extent to which an ADI may use debt to fund investments in banking and insurance subsidiaries.

  • ADIs, at Level 1, will be required to deduct these equity investments from CET1 Capital, but only to the extent the investment in the subsidiary is in excess of 10 per cent of CET1 Capital.
  • An ADI may risk weight the investment, after deduction of any intangibles component, at 250 per cent to the extent the investment is below this 10 per cent threshold.
  • The amount of the exposure that is risk weighted would be included as part of the related party limits detailed in the recently finalised APS 222.

As APRA is more concerned about large concentrated exposures, it proposed to limit the amount of the exposure to an individual subsidiary that can be leveraged to 10 per cent of an ADI’s CET1 Capital. This means capital requirements are increasing for large concentrated exposures, as amounts over the 10 per cent threshold would be required to be met dollar-for-dollar by the ADI parent company.

You can find my original post here which offers more background and may be useful if you are not familiar with the technicalities of Level 1 and Level 2 capital adequacy. At the time the change was proposed, APRA indicated that it would release more detail during 2020 with the aim of implementing the change on 1 January 2021. Covid 19 obviously derailed that original timeline but I assume APRA will provide an update sometime soon.

Tony – From the Outside

Fed money printing and inflation

I will always worry about inflation but I found a post by Morgan Housel offering an interesting counter perspective on what the Fed is doing with the money supply

“The risk of rising inflation over the next few years is probably the highest it’s been in decades. Inflation happens when too much money chases too few goods, and Covid-19 closed a lot of businesses and gave people an unprecedented amount of money. The stars align.

That out of the way, let me cool things down: The Fed is printing a lot of money, but not nearly as much as it looks.”

The short version is that the dramatic increase in recent times can be attributed to a redefinition of savings accounts in the US – link to the post here. The inflation question is obviously way more complex than this simple data point but the post is short and worth reading.

Tony – From the Outside

In Search of a Post-Pandemic Modeling Paradigm – Risk Weighted

Nice post from Tony Hughes discussing the difference between modelling intended to forecast a most likely outcome and modelling tail risk …

“A forecasting mindset yields very tight models, whereas a tail risk mindset demands a far more liberal approach to model specification.”

— Read on riskweighted.com/2021/03/03/in-search-of-a-post-pandemic-modeling-paradigm/

Another reason why monetary authorities might not like stablecoins

Marc Rubinstein’s post (here) on Facebook’s attempt to create an alternative payment mechanism offers a useful summary of the state of play for anyone who has not had the time, nor the inclination, to follow the detail. It includes a short summary of its history, where the initiative currently stands and where it might be headed.

What caught my attention was his discussion of why central banks do not seem to be keen to support private sector initiatives in this domain. Marc noted that Facebook have elected to base their proposed currency (initially the “Libre” but relabelled a “Diem” in a revised proposal issued in December 2020) on a stable coin approach. There are variety of stable coin mechanisms (fiat-backed, commodity backed, cryptocurrency backed, seignorage-style) but in the case of the Diem, the value of the instrument is proposed to be based on an underlying pool of low risk fiat currency assets.

A stable value is great if the aim for the instrument is to facilitate payments for goods and services but it also creates concerns for policy makers. Marc cites a couple of issues …

But this is where policymakers started to get jumpy. They started to worry that if payments and financial transactions shift over to the Libra, they might lose control over their domestic monetary policy, all the more so if their currency isn’t represented in the basket. They worried too about the governance of the Libra Association and about its compliance framework. Perhaps if any other company had been behind it, they would have dismissed the threat, but they’d learned not to underestimate Facebook.”

“Facebook’s Big Diem”, Marc Rubinstein – https://netinterest.substack.com/p/facebooks-big-diem
One more reason why stable coins might be problematic for policy makers responsible for monetary policy and bank supervision?

Initiatives like Diem obviously represent a source of competition and indeed disruption for conventional banks. As a rule, policy makers tend to welcome competition, notwithstanding the potential for competition to undermine financial stability. However “fiat-backed” stable coin based initiatives also compete indirectly with banks in a less obvious way via their demand for the same pool of risk free assets that banks are required to hold for Basel III prudential liquidity requirements.

So central banks might prefer that the stock of government securities be available to fund the liquidity requirements of the banks they are responsible for, as opposed to alternative money systems that they are not responsible for nor have any direct control over.

I know a bit about banking but not a lot about cryptocurrency so it is entirely possible I am missing something here. If so then feedback welcome.

Tony – From the Outside