Ideas and Beliefs – From the outside

Adam Tooze wants everyone to read “The Currency of Politics” by Stefan Eich

I have only just started reading the book myself but the outline that Adam Tooze offers suggests to me that it has a lot to say on an important topic.

At this stage I will have to quote the author for a sense of what this book is about ..

The Currency of Politics is about the layers of past monetary crises that continue to shape our idea of what money is and what it can do politically. Grappling with past crises helped previous theorists to escape the blindspots of their own time. We must do the same today.

This seems like a pretty worthwhile endeavour to me so I thought it was worth sharing for anyone else engaged in trying to make sense of the role that money (and banking) does and should play in our society.

Tony – From the Outside

What Michael Lewis loves about experts

This link takes you to the last of a 7 episode podcast Michael Lewis has done on the role of experts

podcasts.apple.com/au/podcast/against-the-rules-with-michael-lewis/id1455379351

The whole series is highly recommended but I especially like this quote in which he attempts to sum up the series

“Life eventually humbles us all. What I love about experts, the best of them anyway, is that they get to their humility early, they have to, it’s part of who they are, it’s necessary for what they are doing. They set out to get to the bottom of something that has no bottom, and so they are reminded, constantly, of what they don’t know. They move through the world focussed not on what they know but on what they might find out.”

In that spirit, let me know what I am missing

Tony – From the Outside

Why Canada is cultivating an M-pesa moment for bitcoin – Izabella Kaminska

Izabella Kaminska is one of the commentators that I find reliably generates interesting and useful insights. Personally I remain sceptical on crypto but this link takes you to a post where she makes an argument that I find persuasive.

For those short of time here is an extract capturing the key points I took from her post…

My position on crypto has evolved over time to appreciate this factor. Crypto may not be an optimal system. It’s clunky. It’s energy intensive. It’s confusing. But as a back-up system for when the shit really hits the fan, it’s an incredibly worthwhile system to have in place and I increasingly think we should be grateful that some deep-pocketed individuals with concerns for freedom and privacy took the risks they did to make it become a thing.
I have in the past compared crypto to a monetary equivalent of the right to bear arms, whose main purpose, many argue, is to act as a deterrent to rising authoritarianism. Its optimal deployment is as a right that it is never actually exercised.
Crypto should be treated the same way. On a day to day basis, it’s much better for us all to trust in a centralised and properly supervised system. But having crypto there as a challenger or backup system is no bad thing. It should in theory enhance the core system by helping to keep it honest and working in our interests.
“Why Canada is cultivating an M-pesa moment for bitcoin”, The Blind Spot 18 February 2022

Tony – From the Outside

Never let the facts stand in the way of a good story

Shout out to Tim Harford for this introduction to the study of how, in his words, ignorance can be deliberately produced. The technical term “agnatology” is I suspect unlikely to catch on but the underlying message is one worth understanding. At a minimum it is a handy addition to your Scrabble dictionary.

The article was originally published in March 2017 but I only came across it recently via this podcast interview Harford did with Cardiff Garcia on “The New Bazaar”. The context in 2017 was the successful campaign for the US presidency that Donald Trump ran during 2016 with a bit of Brexit thrown in but this is a challenge that is not going away anytime soon.

Harford notes that it is tempting to think that the answer to the challenge posed by what has come to be known as a post truth society lies in a better process to establish the facts

The instinctive reaction from those of us who still care about the truth — journalists, academics and many ordinary citizens — has been to double down on the facts.

He affirms the need to have some agreement on how we distinguish facts from opinions and assertions but he cautions that this is unlikely to solve the problem. He cites the tobacco industry response to the early evidence that smoking causes cancer to illustrate why facts alone are not enough.

A good place to start is by delving into why facts alone are not enough – a few extracts from the article hopefully capture the main lessons

Doubt is usually not hard to produce, and facts alone aren’t enough to dispel it. We should have learnt this lesson already; now we’re going to have to learn it all over again…
Tempting as it is to fight lies with facts, there are three problems with that strategy…
The first is that a simple untruth can beat off a complicated set of facts simply by being easier to understand and remember. When doubt prevails, people will often end up believing whatever sticks in the mind…
There’s a second reason why facts don’t seem to have the traction that one might hope. Facts can be boring. The world is full of things to pay attention to, from reality TV to your argumentative children, from a friend’s Instagram to a tax bill. Why bother with anything so tedious as facts?…
In the war of ideas, boredom and distraction are powerful weapons.
The endgame of these distractions is that matters of vital importance become too boring to bother reporting…
There’s a final problem with trying to persuade people by giving them facts: the truth can feel threatening, and threatening people tends to backfire. “People respond in the opposite direction,” says Jason Reifler, a political scientist at Exeter University. This “backfire effect” is now the focus of several researchers, including Reifler and his colleague Brendan Nyhan of Dartmouth…
The problem here is that while we like to think of ourselves as rational beings, our rationality didn’t just evolve to solve practical problems, such as building an elephant trap, but to navigate social situations. We need to keep others on our side. Practical reasoning is often less about figuring out what’s true, and more about staying in the right tribe…
We see what we want to see — and we reject the facts that threaten our sense of who we are…
When we reach the conclusion that we want to reach, we’re engaging in “motivated reasoning”…
Even in a debate polluted by motivated reasoning, one might expect that facts will help. Not necessarily: when we hear facts that challenge us, we selectively amplify what suits us, ignore what does not, and reinterpret whatever we can. More facts mean more grist to the motivated reasoning mill. The French dramatist Molière once wrote: “A learned fool is more foolish than an ignorant one.” Modern social science agrees…
When people are seeking the truth, facts help. But when people are selectively reasoning about their political identity, the facts can backfire.

So what are we to do?

Harford cites a study that explores the value of scientific curiosity

What Kahan and his colleagues found, to their surprise, was that while politically motivated reasoning trumps scientific knowledge, “politically motivated reasoning . . . appears to be negated by science curiosity”. Scientifically literate people, remember, were more likely to be polarised in their answers to politically charged scientific questions. But scientifically curious people were not. Curiosity brought people together in a way that mere facts did not. The researchers muse that curious people have an extra reason to seek out the facts: “To experience the pleasure of contemplating surprising insights into how the world works.”

It is of course entirely possible that Tim Harford’s assessment is just calling to my own bias. I will admit that one the things that I always looked for when hiring, or working, with people was curiosity. These people are surprisingly rare but (IMHO) worth their weight in gold. An intellectually curious mind makes up for a lot of other areas where the person might not be perfect in terms of skills or experience. The general point (I think) also ties to the often cited problem that people with lots of knowledge can sometimes be prone to not being so street smart. Nassim Taleb makes this argument in nearly everything he writes.

So Tim Harford might not be offering the entire answer but I think his article is worth reading on two counts

Firstly as a cautionary tale against expecting that all debates and disputes can be resolved by simply establishing the “facts”
Secondly as a reminder of the power of a curious mind and the value of the never-ending search for “what am I missing?”

Let me know what I am missing

Tony – From the Outside

Andrew Haldane

Claire Jones writing for the Financial Times Alphaville column confesses a fondness for the speeches of Andrew Haldane (departing chief economist at the Bank of England) . She offered a selection of favourites (you can access her column by signing up to Alphaville if you are not an FT subscriber).

I also rate pretty much everything he writes as worth reading often more than once to reflect on the issues he raises. To her top three Haldane speeches, I will add one he did in 2016 titled “The Great Divide” which explored the gap between the way banks perceive themselves and how they are perceived by the community.

Tony – From the Outside

The potential for computer code to supplant the traditional operating framework of the economy and society

I am very far from expert on the issues discussed in the podcast this post links to, I am trying however to “up-skill”. The subject matter is a touch wonky so this is not a must listen recommendation. That said, the questions of DeFi and cryptocurrency are ones that I believe any serious student of banking and finance needs to understand.

In the podcast Demetri Kofinas (Host of the Hidden Forces podcast) is interviewed by two strong advocates of DeFi and crypto debating the potential of computer code to supplant legal structures as an operating framework for society. Demetri supports the idea that smart contracts can automate agreements but argues against the belief that self-executing software can or should supplant our legal systems. Computer code has huge potential in these applications but he maintains that you will still rely on some traditional legal and government framework to protect property rights and enforce property rights. He also argues that it is naïve and dangerous to synonymize open-source software with liberal democracy.

I am trying to keep an open mind on these questions but (thus far) broadly support the positions Demetri argues. There is a lot of ground to cover but Demetri is (based on my non-expert understanding of the topic) one of the better sources of insight I have come across.

Tony – From the Outside

What is the alternative to Friedman’s capitalism?

I have been digging into the debate about what Milton Friedman got right and wrong about the social responsibility of business. I am still in the process of organising my thoughts but this discussion on the “Capitalisn’t” podcast is, I think, worth listening to for anyone interested in the questions that Friedman’s 1970 essay raises.

You can find the podcast here

podcasts.apple.com/au/podcast/what-is-the-alternative-to-friedmans-capitalism/id1326698855

Tony – From the Outside

Corporate social responsibility – going back to the source

The 50th anniversary of Milton Friedman’s 1970 essay has triggered a deluge of commentary celebrating or critiquing the ideas it proposed. My bias probably swings to the “profit maximisation is not the entire answer” side of the debate but I recognised that I had not actually read the original essay. Time, I thought, to go back to the source and see what Friedman actually said.

I personally found this exercise useful because I realised that some of the commentary I had been reading was quoting him out of context or otherwise reading into his essay ideas that I am not sure he would have endorsed. I will leave my comment on the merits of his doctrine to another post.

Friedman’s doctrine of the limits of corporate social responsibility

Friedman’s famous (or infamous) conclusion is that in a “free” society…

“there is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception fraud.”

My more detailed notes on what Friedman wrote can be found here. That note includes lengthy extracts from the essay so that you can fact check my paraphrasing of what he said. My summary of his argument as I understand it runs as follows:

Friedman first seeks to establish that any meaningful discussion of social responsibility has to focus on the people who own or manage the business, not “the business” itself.
If we focus on the corporate executives who manage the business as agents of the shareholders, Friedman argues that these executive should only use the resources of a company to pursue the objectives set by their “employer” (i.e. the shareholders).
What do the shareholders want the business to do?
Friedman acknowledges that some may have different objectives but he assumes that profit maximisation constrained by the laws and ethical customs of the society in which they operate will be goal of most shareholders
The key point however is that corporate executives have no authority or right to pursue any objectives other than those defined by their employer (the shareholders) or which otherwise serve the interests of those people.
Friedman also argues that the expansion of social responsibilities introduces conflicts of interest into the management of the business without offering any guide or proper process for resolving them. Having multiple (possibly ill defined and conflicting) objectives is, Friedman argues, a recipe for giving executives an excuse to underperform.
Friedman acknowledges that corporate executives have the right to pursue whatever social responsibilities they choose in their private lives but, as corporate executives, their personal objectives must be subordinated to the responsibility to achieve the objectives of the shareholders, their ultimate employers.
It is important to understand how Friedman defined the idea of a corporate executive having a “social responsibility”. He argues that the concept is only meaningful if it creates a responsibility that is not consistent with the interests of their employer.
Friedman might be sceptical on the extent to which it is true, but my read of his essay is that he is not disputing the rights of a business to contribute to social and environmental goals that management believe are congruent with the long term profitability of the business.
Friedman argues that the use of company resources to pursue a social responsibility raises problematic political questions on two levels: principle and consequences.
On the level of POLITICAL PRINCIPLE, Friedman uses the rhetorical device of treating the exercise of social responsibility by a corporate executive as equivalent to the imposition of a tax
But it is intolerable for Friedman that this political power can be exercised by a corporate executive without the checks and balances that apply to government and government officials dealing with these fundamentally political choices.
On the grounds of CONSEQUENCES, Friedman questions whether the corporate executives have the knowledge and expertise to discharge the “social responsibilities” they have assumed on behalf of society. Poor consequences are acceptable if the executive is spending their own time and money but unacceptable as a point of principle when using someone else’s time and money.
Friedman cites a list of social challenges that he argues are likely to lay outside the domain of a corporate executive’s area of expertise
Private competitive enterprise is for Friedman the best way to make choices about how to allocate resources in society. This is because it forces people to be responsible for their own actions and makes it difficult for them to exploit other people for either selfish or unselfish purposes.
Friedman considers whether some social problems are too urgent to be left to the political process but dismisses this argument on two counts. Firstly because he is suspicious about how genuine the commitment to “social responsibility” really is but mostly because he is fundamentally committed to the principle that these kinds of social questions should be decided by the political process.
Friedman acknowledges that his doctrine makes it harder for good people to do good but that, he argues, is a “small price” to pay to avoid the greater evil of being forced to conform to an objective you as an individual do not agree with.
Friedman also considers the idea that shareholders can themselves choose to contribute to social causes but dismisses it. This is partly because he believes that these “choices” are forced on the majority by the shareholder activists but also because he believes that using the “cloak of social responsibility” to rationalise these choices undermines the foundations of a free society.
That is a big statement – how does he justify it?
He starts by citing a list of ways in which socially responsible actions can be argued (or rationalised) to be in the long-run interests of a corporation.
Friedman acknowledges that corporate executives are well within their rights to take “socially responsible” actions if they believe that their company can benefit from this “hypocritical window dressing”.
Friedman notes the irony of expecting business to exercise social responsibility by foregoing these short term benefits but argues that using the “cloak of social responsibility” in this way harms the foundations of a free society
Friedman cites the calls for wage and price controls (remember this was written in 1970) as one example of the way in which social responsibility can undermine a free society
But he also sees the trend for corporate executives to embrace social responsibility as part of a wider movement that paints the pursuit of profit as “wicked and immoral”. A free enterprise, market based, society is central to Friedman’s vision of a politically free society and must be defended to the fullest extent possible.
Here Friedman expands on the principles behind his commitment to the market mechanism as an instrument of freedom – in particular the principle of “unanimity” under which the market coordinates the needs and wants of individuals and no one is compelled to do something against their perceived interests.
He contrasts this with the principle of “conformity” that underpins the political mechanism.
In Friedman’s ideal world, all decisions would be based on the principle of unanimity but he acknowledges that this is not always possible.
He argues that the line needs to be drawn when the doctrine of “social responsibility” extends the political mechanisms of conformity and coercion into areas which can be addressed by the market mechanism.

Friedman concludes by labelling “social responsibility” a “fundamentally subversive doctrine”.

But the doctrine of “social responsibility” taken seriously would extend the scope of the political mechanism to every human activity. It does not differ in philosophy from the most explicitly collectivist doctrine. It differs only by professing to believe that collectivist ends can be attained without collectivist means.

That is why, in my book “Capitalism and Freedom,” I have called it a “fundamentally subversive doctrine” in a free society, and have said that in such a society, “there is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception fraud.”

Hopefully what I have set out above offers a fair and unbiased account of what Friedman actually said. If not then tell me what I missed. I think he makes a number of good points but, as stated at the beginning of this post, I am not comfortable with the conclusions that he draws. I am working on a follow up post where I will attempt to deconstruct the essay and set out my perspective on the questions he sought to address.

Tony – From the Outside

The power of ideas

This post was inspired by a paper by Dani Rodrik titled “When Ideas Trump Interests: Preferences, Worldviews, and Policy Innovations”. I have set out some more detailed notes here for the policy wonks but the paper is not light reading. The short version here attempts to highlight a couple of ideas I found especially interesting.

Rodrik starts by noting a tendency to interpret economic and social outcomes through the lens of “vested interests” while paying less attention to the ideas that underpin these outcomes. The vested interest approach looks for who benefits and how much power they have to explain outcomes. Rodrik does not dispute the relevance of understanding whose interests are in play when economic choices are being made but argues that “ideas” are an equally powerful motivating force.

Rodrik expresses his point this way:

“Ideas are strangely absent from modern models of political economy. In most prevailing theories of policy choice, the dominant role is instead played by “vested interests”—elites, lobbies, and rent-seeking groups which get their way at the expense of the general public. Economists, political scientists, and other social scientists appeal to the power of special interests to explain key puzzles in regulation, international trade, economic growth and development, puzzles in regulation, international trade, economic growth and development, and many other fields.”
“When Ideas Trump Interests: Preferences, Worldviews, and Policy Innovations” Dani Rodrik, Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 28, Number 1—Winter 2014—Pages 189–208

Applying this lens offers a broader and more nuanced perspective of how self and vested interest operates (emphasis added).

“… a focus on ideas provides us with a new perspective on vested interests too. As social constructivists like to put it, “interests are an idea.” Even if economic actors are driven purely by interests, they often have only a limited and preconceived idea of where their interests lie. This may be true in general, of course, but it is especially true in politics, where preferences are tightly linked to people’s sense of identity and new strategies can always be invented. What the economist typically treats as immutable self-interest is too often an artifact of ideas about who we are, how the world works, and what actions are available.”
Ibid

The importance of understanding how ideas drive public policy and personal choices resonates with me. One of the examples Rodrik used to illustrate his argument was bank regulation pre the GFC. Rodrik does not dispute that self and vested interests play a significant role but he explores the equally important role of ideas in shaping how interests are defined and pursued and the ways in which the models people use to understand the world shape their actions.

Applying this lens to bank regulation

Many observers … have argued that the policies that produced the crisis were the result of powerful banking and financial interests getting their way, which seems like a straightforward application of the theory of special interests.

But this begs the question why were banking vested interests allowed to get their way. The “vested interest” argument is “regulatory capture” but Rodrik offers an alternative explanation …

Still, without the wave of ideas “in the air” that favored financial liberalization and self-regulation and emphasized the impossibility (or undesirability) of government regulation, these vested interests would not have gotten nearly as much traction as they did. After all, powerful interests rarely get their way in a democracy by nakedly arguing for their own self-interest. Instead, they seek legitimacy for their arguments by saying these policies are in the public interest. The argument in favor of financial deregulation was not that it was good for Wall Street, but that it was good for Main Street.

Other observers have argued that the financial crisis was a result of excessive government intervention to support housing markets, especially for lower-income borrowers. These arguments were also grounded on certain ideas—about the social value of homeownership and the inattentiveness of the financial sector to those with lower incomes. Again, ideas apparently shaped politicians’ views of how the world works— and therefore their interest in acting in ways that precipitated the crisis.

I want to come back to this topic in another post. I have touched on the issue of self interest in an earlier post looking at a book by Samuel Bowles titled “The Moral Economy”. Rodrik’s paper offers another perspective on the issue as does his book “Economics Rules: Why Economics Works, When It Fails, and How To Tell The Difference”. I have some notes on a couple of other books including “The Economists’ Hour” by Binyamin Applebaum and The Value of Everything” by Mariana Mazzucato. All of these have something interesting to say but I want to think some more before attempting to say something.

Let me conclude for the moment with John Maynard Keynes (emphasis added …

“The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately, but after a certain interval; for in the field of economic and political philosophy there are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age, so that the ideas which civil servants and politicians and even agitators apply to current events are not likely to be the newest. But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.”
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 1936

Tony (From the Outside)

Distinguishing luck and skill

Quantifying Luck’s Role in the Success Equation

“… we vastly underestimate the role of luck in what we see happening around us”

This post is inspired by a recent read of Michael Mauboussin’s book “The Success Equation: Untangling Skill and Luck in Business, Sports and Investing”. Mauboussin focuses on the fact that much of what we experience is a combination of skill and luck but we tend to be quite bad at distinguishing the two. It may not unlock the secret to success but, if you want to get better at untangling the contributions that skill and luck play in predicting or managing future outcomes, then this book still has much to offer.

“The argument here is not that you can precisely measure the contributions of skill and luck to any success or failure. But if you take concrete steps toward attempting to measure those relative contributions, you will make better decisions than people who think improperly about those issues or who don’t think about them at all.”

Structure wise, Mauboussin:

Starts with the conceptual foundations for thinking about the problem of distinguishing skill and luck,
Explores the analytical tools we can use to figure out the extent to which luck contributes to our achievements, successes and failures,
Finishes with some concrete suggestions about how to put the conceptual foundations and analytical tools to work in dealing with luck in decisions.

Conceptual foundations

It is always good to start by defining your terms; Mauboussin defines luck and skill as follows:

“Luck is a chance occurrence that affects a person or a group.. [and] can be good or bad [it] is out of one’s control and unpredictable”
Skill is defined as the “ability to use one’s knowledge effectively and readily in execution or performance.”

Applying the process that Mauboussin proposes requires that we first roughly distinguish where a specific activity or prediction fits on the continuum bookended by skill and luck. Mauboussin also clarifies that:

Luck and randomness are related but not the same: He distinguishes luck as operating at the level of the individual or small group while randomness operates at the level of the system where more persistent and reliable statistical patterns can be observed.
Expertise does not necessarily accumulate with experience: It is often assumed that doing something for a long time is sufficient to be an expert but Mauboussin argues that in activities that depend on skill, real expertise only comes about via deliberate practice based on improving performance in response to feedback on the ways in which the input generates the predicted outcome.

Mauboussin is not necessarily introducing anything new in his analysis of why we tend to bad at distinguishing skill and luck. The fact that people tend to struggle with statistics is well-known. The value for me in this book lies largely in his discussion of the psychological dimension of the problem which he highlights as exerting the most profound influence. The quote below captures an important insight that I wish I understood forty years ago.

“The mechanisms that our minds use to make sense of the world are not well suited to accounting for the relative roles that skill and luck play in the events we see taking shape around us.”

The role of ideas, beliefs and narratives is a recurring theme in Mauboussin’s analysis of the problem of distinguishing skill and luck. Mauboussin notes that people seem to be pre-programmed to want to fit events into a narrative based on cause and effect. The fact that things sometimes just happen for no reason is not a satisfying narrative. We are particularly susceptible to attributing successful outcomes to skill, preferably our own, but we seem to be willing to extend the same presumption to other individuals who have been successful in an endeavour. It is a good story and we love stories so we suppress other explanations and come to see what happened as inevitable.

Some of the evidence we use to create these narratives will be drawn from what happened in specific examples of the activity, while we may also have access to data averaged over a larger sample of similar events. Irrespective, we seem to be predisposed to weigh the specific evidence more heavily in our intuitive judgement than we do the base rate averaged over many events (most likely based on statistics we don’t really understand). That said, statistical evidence can still be “useful” if it “proves” something we already believe; we seem to have an intuitive bias to seek evidence that supports what we believe. Not only do we fail to look for evidence that disproves our narrative, we tend to actively suppress any contrary evidence we encounter.

Analytical tools for navigating the skill luck continuum

We need tools and processes to help manage the tendency for our intuitive judgements to lead us astray and to avoid being misled by arguments that fall into the same trap or, worse, deliberately exploit these known weaknesses in our decision-making process.

One process proposed by Mauboussin for distinguishing skill from luck is to:

First form a generic judgement on what the expected accuracy of our prediction is likely to be (i.e. make a judgement on where the activity sits on the skill-luck continuum)
Next look at the available empirical or anecdotal evidence, distinguishing between the base rate for this type of activity (if it exists) and any specific evidence to hand
Then employ the following rule:
- if the expected accuracy of the prediction is low (i.e. luck is likely to be a significant factor), you should place most of the weight on the base rate
- if the expected accuracy is high (i.e. there is evidence that skill plays the prime role in determining the outcome of what you are attempting to predict), you can rely more on the specific case.
use the data to test if the activity conforms to your original judgement of how skill and luck combine to generate the outcomes

Figuring out where the activity sits on the skill-luck continuum is the critical first step and Mauboussin offers three methods for undertaking this part of the process: 1) The “Three Question” approach, 2) Simulation and 3) True Score Theory. I will focus here on the first method which involves

First ask if you can easily assign a cause to the effect you are seeking to predict. In some instances the relationship will be relatively stable and linear (and hence relatively easy to predict) whereas the results of other activities are shaped by complex dependencies such as cumulative advantage and social preference. Skill can play a part in both activities but luck is likely to be a more significant factor in the latter group.
Determining the rate of reversion to the mean: Slow reversion is consistent with activities dominated by skill, while rapid reversion comes from luck being the more dominant influence. Note however that complex activities where cumulative advantage and social preference shape the outcome may not have a well-defined mean to revert to. The distribution of outcomes for these activities frequently conform to a power law (i.e. there are lots of small values and relatively few large values).
Is there evidence that expert prediction is useful? When experts have wide disagreement and predict poorly, that is evidence that luck is a prime factor shaping outcomes.

One of the challenges with this process is to figure out how large a sample size you need to determine if there is a reliable relationship between actions and outcome that evidences skill. Another problem is that a reliable base rate may not always be available. That may be because the data has just not been collected but also because a reliable base rate simply may not even exist.

The absence of a reliable base rate to guide decisions is a feature of activities that do not have simple linear relationships between cause and effect. These activities also tend to fall into Nassim Taleb’s “black swan” domain. The fundamental lesson in this domain of decision making is to be aware of the risks associated with naively applying statistical probability based methods to the problem. Paul Wilmott and David Orrell use the idea of a “zone of validity” to make the same point in “The Money Formula”.

The need to understand power laws and the mechanisms that generate them also stands out in Mauboussin’s discussion of untangling skill and luck.

The presence of a power law depends in part on whether events are dependent on, or independent of, one another. In dependent systems, initial conditions matter and come to matter more and more as time goes on. The final outcomes are (sometimes surprisingly) sensitive to both minor variations in the initial conditions and to the path taken over time. Mauboussin notes that a number of mechanisms are responsible for this phenomenon including preferential attachment, critical points and phase transitions are also crucial.

“In some realms, independence and bell-shaped distributions of luck can explain much of what we see. But in activities such as the entertainment industry, success depends on social interaction. Whenever people can judge the quality of an item by several different criteria and are allowed to influence one another’s choices, luck will play a huge role in determining success or failure.”
“For example, if one song happens to be slightly more popular than another at just the right time, it will tend to become even more popular as people influence one another. Because of that effect, known as cumulative advantage, two songs of equal quality, or skill, will sell in substantially different numbers. … skill does play a role in success and failure, but it can be overwhelmed by the influence of luck. In the jar model, the range of numbers in the luck jar is vastly greater than the range of numbers in the skill jar.”
“The process of social influence and cumulative advantage frequently generates a distribution that is best described by a power law.”
“The term power law comes from the fact that an exponent (or power) determines the slope of the line. One of the key features of distributions that follow a power law is that there are very few large values and lots of small values. As a result, the idea of an “average” has no meaning.”

Mauboussin’s discussion of power laws does not offer this specific example but the idea that the average is meaningless is also true of loan losses when you are trying to measure expected loss over a full loan loss cycle. What we tend to observe is lots of relatively small values when economic conditions are benign and a few very large losses when the cycle turns down, probably amplified by endogenous factors embedded in bank balance sheets or business models. This has interesting and important implications for the concept of Expected Loss which is a fundamental component of the advanced Internal Rating Based approach to bank capital adequacy measurement.

Mauboussin concludes with a list of ten suggestions for untangling and navigating the divide between luck and skill:

Understand where you are on the luck skill continuum
Assess sample size, significance and swans
Always consider a null hypothesis – is there some evidence that proves that my base belief is wrong
Think carefully about feedback and rewards; High quality feedback is key to high performance. Where skill is more important, then deliberate practice is essential to improving performance. Where luck plays a strong role, the focus must be on process
Make use of counterfactuals; To maintain an open mind about the future, it is very useful to keep an open mind about the past. History is a narrative of cause and effect but it is useful to reflect on how outcomes might have been different.
Develop aids to guide and improve your skill; On the luck side of the continuum, skill is still relevant but luck makes the outcomes more probabilistic. So the focus must be on good process – especially one that takes account of behavioural biases. In the middle of the spectrum, the procedural is combined with the novel. Checklists can be useful here – especially when decisions must be made under stress. Where skill matters, the key is deliberate practice and being open to feedback
Have a plan for strategic interactions. Where your opponent is more skilful or just stronger, then try to inject more luck into the interaction
Make reversion to the mean work for you; Understand why reversion to the mean happens, to what degree it happens, what exactly the mean is. Note that extreme events are unlikely to be repeated and most importantly, recognise that the rate of reversion to the mean relates to the coefficient of correlation
Develop useful statistics (i.e.stats that are persistent and predictive)
Know your limitations; we can do better at untangling skill and luck but also must recognise how much we don’t know. We must recognise that the realm may change such that old rules don’t apply and there are places where statistics don’t apply

All in all, I found Maubossin’s book very rewarding and can recommend it highly. Hopefully the above post does the book justice. I have also made some more detailed notes on the book here.

Tony