The Power of Ideas

In the interests of full disclosure, the following post was written by Google Notebook LM’s “blog” report writing feature. It references a paper titled “When Ideas Trump Interests,” by economist Dani Rodrik I read a while back but never got around to writing up.

Over to Notebook LM ….

Introduction: The Hidden Force in Politics

It is a common and cynical view of politics: powerful “vested interests” and special interest groups always get their way at the expense of the general public. We see it as a battle of raw power, where lobbies and elites push their agenda, and the rest of us pay the price. This perspective is so ingrained that it forms the foundation of most modern models of political economy.

But what if this view is incomplete? In his paper, “When Ideas Trump Interests,” economist Dani Rodrik challenges this conventional wisdom. He argues that before we can even talk about interests, we have to talk about “ideas”—a powerful, often overlooked force that shapes what those interests are, how actors understand the world, and what they believe is possible. This perspective doesn’t dismiss the role of powerful groups, but it places them in a new context where their influence is not a foregone conclusion.

This post will distill the most surprising and impactful takeaways from Rodrik’s argument. We will explore how ideas about our identity, our understanding of the world, and our policy imagination are the true drivers of political outcomes.

Three Surprising Ways Ideas Shape Our World

The standard political playbook focuses on interests and power, but the real story is often more complex. Here are three key insights that reveal how ideas, not just interests, shape our world.

Takeaway 1: Your ‘Interests’ Aren’t Fixed—They’re an Idea About Who You Are

The concept of “self-interest” seems simple enough—we all want what’s best for ourselves. But Rodrik argues that before anyone can pursue their interest, they must first have an idea of their “self.” Who we believe we are fundamentally determines what we value and, therefore, what we pursue.

This identity isn’t fixed or purely economic. We might see ourselves primarily as a member of a social class (‘middle class’), an ethnic group, a religion, a nation (‘global citizen’), or a profession. These identities dictate our priorities, which can easily override purely material concerns. As the source text notes, abstract ideals and moral conceptions can be powerful motivators:

“humans will kill and die not only to protect their own lives or defend kin and kith, but for an idea—the moral conception they form of themselves, of ‘who we are’”

This is a profoundly counter-intuitive point because it helps explain a wide range of “anomalous” political actions. When people vote against their immediate material interests, it’s often because an idea about their identity—their values, their community, their place in the world—has taken precedence.

Takeaway 2: Policy Is Driven by Beliefs About How the World Works

Policymakers and political groups don’t operate in a vacuum; they act based on their “worldviews,” or their mental models of how the economy and society function. These underlying ideas create the entire framework for political debate and lead to vastly different policy preferences. Think of the great economic debates: laissez-faire vs. planning, free trade vs. protectionism, or Keynesian vs. Hayekian economics. Each position stems from a different core idea about how the world works.

The 2008 global financial crisis is a perfect case study. It’s easy to blame powerful banking interests for the policies that led to the meltdown, and they were certainly a factor. However, their success was enabled by a prevailing set of ideas that favored financial liberalization and self-regulation. The argument that won the day wasn’t that deregulation was good for Wall Street, but that it was good for Main Street—that it was in the public interest.

But this isn’t a one-sided phenomenon. As Rodrik points out, the other side of the debate was also driven by ideas. Many observers argued the crisis was caused by excessive government intervention to support housing markets. This view wasn’t just a cover for other interests; it was grounded in powerful ideas about the social value of homeownership and the need to correct for the financial sector’s inattentiveness to lower-income borrowers. Powerful interests rarely win by nakedly arguing for their own gain; they seek legitimacy by framing their goals within a popular and persuasive idea. This is critical because it tells us that changing policy isn’t just about overpowering an opposing group. It requires challenging the underlying ideas and narratives that give that group’s position its legitimacy in the first place.

Takeaway 3: Political Gridlock Can Be Broken by Creative Policy—Not Just Power Shifts

A common argument in political economy is that entrenched elites often block efficient, growth-oriented policies because they fear losing their political power. If a new policy threatens their position, they will fight it, even if it benefits society as a whole. This creates a state of permanent gridlock where progress is impossible.

Rodrik offers a more optimistic counter-argument, introducing a concept he calls the “political transformation frontier”—the set of maximal economic outcomes elites believe they can achieve without losing power. The standard view assumes this frontier is fixed. But Rodrik argues that new policy ideas can shift the entire frontier outward, creating win-win scenarios that allow for progress without directly threatening elite power. The key is not to overpower the elites, but to reframe the problem with an innovative solution.

China’s “dual-track” reform is the prime example. In the 1970s, liberalizing agriculture would have created huge efficiency gains but destroyed the state’s tax base. Instead of abolishing the old system, Chinese leaders grafted a market system on top of it. Farmers still had to meet state grain quotas at fixed prices, but they were free to sell any surplus on the open market. This creative idea allowed China to gain the benefits of market incentives while protecting the rents and power of the state sector. The Communist Party was strengthened, not weakened.

This principle is a recurring pattern, not a one-off. A similar dynamic played out in Japan after the Meiji restoration. There, elites spurred industrialization but designed it in a way that would “strengthen the centralized government and increasing the entrenchment of bureaucratic elites.” In both cases, a creative idea allowed elites to pursue economic gains not as a threat to their power, but as a means of consolidating it. This takeaway has an optimistic implication: many political problems that seem impossible may be solvable with the right innovative idea.

Conclusion: It’s the Ideas, Stupid

The traditional view of politics as a raw contest of vested interests is compellingly simple, but ultimately incomplete. Interests are not fixed, pre-ordained forces. They are shaped and defined by ideas—ideas about our identity, ideas about how the world works, and ideas about what is possible.

As Rodrik’s work powerfully argues, the failure to see the role of ideas leads to a pessimistic and static view of political change. By putting ideas back at the center of the analysis, we see that political outcomes are not inevitable. The source text concludes with a thought that perfectly captures this shift in perspective:

“What the economist typically treats as immutable self-interest is too often an artifact of ideas about who we are, how the world works, and what actions are available.”

This leaves us with a final, crucial question. If ideas are this powerful, perhaps the most important political question isn’t just ‘who has power?’ but ‘which ideas will define our future?’

Deposit insurance and moral hazard

Depositors tend to be a protected species

It is generally agreed that bank deposits have a privileged position in the financial system. There are exceptions to the rule such as NZ which, not only eschews deposit insurance, but also the practice of granting deposits a preferred (or super senior) claim on the assets of the bank. NZ also has a unique approach to bank resolution which clearly includes imposing losses on bank deposits as part of the recapitalisation process. Deposit insurance is under review in NZ but it is less clear if that review contemplates revisiting the question of deposit preference.

The more common practice is for deposits to rank at, or near, the top of the queue in their claim on the assets of the issuing bank. This preferred claim is often supported by some form of limited deposit insurance (increasingly so post the Global Financial Crisis of 2008). An assessment of the full benefit has to consider the cost of providing the payment infrastructure that bank depositors require but the issuing bank benefits from the capacity to raise funds at relatively low interest rates. The capacity to raise funding in the form of deposits also tends to mean that the issuing banks will be heavily regulated which adds another layer of cost.


The question is whether depositors should be protected

I am aware of two main arguments for protecting depositors:

  • One is to protect the savings of financially unsophisticated individuals and small businesses.
  • The other major benefit relates to the short-term, on-demand, nature of deposits that makes them convenient for settling transactions but can also lead to a ‘bank run’.

The fact is that retail depositors are simply not well equipped to evaluate the solvency and liquidity of a bank. Given that even the professionals can fail to detect problems in banks, it is not clear why people who will tend to lie at the unsophisticated end of the spectrum should be expected to do any better. However, the unsophisticated investor argument by itself is probably not sufficient. We allow these individuals to invest in the shares of banks and other risky investments so what is special about deposits.

The more fundamental issue is that, by virtue of the way in which they function as a form of money, bank deposits should not be analysed as “investments”. To function as money the par value of bank deposits must be unquestioned and effectively a matter of faith or trust. Deposit insurance and deposit preference are the tools we use to underwrite the safety and liquidity of bank deposits and this is essential if bank deposits are to function as money. We know the economy needs money to facilitate economic activity so if bank deposits don’t perform this function then you need something else that does. Whatever the alternative form of money decided on, you are still left with the core issue of how to make it safe and liquid.

Quote
“The capacity of a financial instrument like a bank deposit to be accepted and used as money depends on the ability of uninformed agents to trade it without fear of loss; i.e. the extent to which the value of the instrument is insulated from any adverse information about the counterparty”

Gary Gorton and George Pennacchi “Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation”

I recognise that fintech solutions are increasingly offering alternative payment mechanisms that offer some of the functions of money but to date these still ultimately rely on a bank with a settlement account at the central bank to function. This post on Alphaville is worth reading if you are interested in this area of financial innovation. The short version is that fintechs have not been able to create new money in the way banks do but this might be changing.

But what about moral hazard?

There is an argument that depositors should not be a protected class because insulation from risk creates moral hazard.

While government deposit insurance has proven very successful in protecting banks from runs, it does so at a cost because it leads to moral hazard (Santos, 2000, p. 8). By offering a guarantee that depositors are not subject to loss, the provider of deposit insurance bears the risk that they would otherwise have borne.

According to Dr Sam Wylie (2009, p. 7) from the Melbourne Business School:

“The Government eliminates the adverse selection problem of depositors by insuring them against default by the bank. In doing so the Government creates a moral hazard problem for itself. The deposit insurance gives banks an incentive to make higher risk loans that have commensurately higher interest payments. Why?, because they are then betting with taxpayer’s money. If the riskier loans are repaid the owners of the bank get the benefit. If not, and the bank’s assets cannot cover liabilities, then the Government must make up the shortfall”

Reconciling Prudential Regulation with Competition, Pegasus Economics, May 2019 (p17)

A financial system that creates moral hazard is clearly undesirable but, for the reasons set out above, it is less clear to me that bank depositors are the right set of stakeholders to take on the responsibility of imposing market discipline on banks. There is a very real problem here but requiring depositors to take on this task is not the answer.

The paper by Gorton and Pennacchi that I referred to above notes that there is a variety of ways to make bank deposits liquid (i.e. insensitive to adverse information about the bank) but they argue for solutions where depositors have a sufficiently deep and senior claim on the assets of the bank that any volatility in their value is of no concern. This of course is what deposit insurance and giving deposits a preferred claim in the bank loss hierarchy does. Combining deposit insurance with a preferred claim on a bank’s assets also means that the government can underwrite deposit insurance with very little risk of loss.

It is also important I think to recognise that deposit preference moves the risk to other parts of the balance sheet that are arguably better suited to the task of exercising market discipline. The quote above from Pegasus Economics focussed on deposit insurance and I think has a fair point if the effect is simply to move risk from depositors to the government. That is part of the reason why I think that deposit preference, combined with how the deposit insurance is funded, are also key elements of the answer.

Designing a banking system that addresses the role of bank deposits as the primary form of money without the moral hazard problem

I have argued that the discussion of moral hazard is much more productive when the risk of failure is directed at stakeholders who have the expertise to monitor bank balance sheets, the capacity to absorb the risk and who are compensated for undertaking this responsibility. If depositors are not well suited to the market discipline task then who should bear the responsibility?

  • Senior unsecured debt
  • Non preferred senior debt (Tier 3 capital?)
  • Subordinated debt (i.e. Tier 2 capital)
  • Additional Tier 1 (AT1)
  • Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1)

There is a tension between liquidity and risk. Any security that is risky may be liquid during normal market conditions but this “liquidity” cannot be relied on under adverse conditions. Senior debt can in principle be a risky asset but most big banks will also aim to be able to issue senior debt on the best terms they can achieve to maximise liquidity. In practice, this means that big banks will probably aim for a Long Term Senior Debt Rating that is safely above the “investment grade” threshold. Investment grade ratings offer not just the capacity top issue at relatively low credit spreads but also, and possibly more importantly, access to a deeper and more reliable pool of funding.

Cheaper funding is nice to have but reliable access to funding is a life and death issue for banks when they have to continually roll over maturing debt to keep the wheels of their business turning. This is also the space where banks can access the pools of really long term funding that are essential to meet the liquidity and long term funding requirements that have been introduced under Basel III.

The best source of market discipline probably lies in the space between senior debt and common equity

I imagine that not every one will agree with me on this but I do not see common equity as a great source of market discipline on banks. Common equity is clearly a risky asset but the fact that shareholders benefit from taking risk is also a reason why they are inclined to give greater weight to the upside than to the downside when considering risk reward choices. As a consequence, I am not a fan of the “big equity” approach to bank capital requirements.

In my view, the best place to look for market discipline and the control of moral hazard in banking lies in securities that fill the gap between senior unsecured debt and common equity; i.e. non-preferred senior debt, subordinated debt and Additional Tier 1. I also see value in having multiple layers of loss absorption as opposed to one big homogeneous layer of loss absorption. This is partly because it can be more cost effective to find different groups of investors with different risk appetites. Possibly more important is that multiple layers offer both the banks and supervisors more flexibility in the size and impact of the way these instruments are used to recapitalise the bank.

Summing up …

I have held off putting this post up because I wanted the time to think through the issues and ensure (to the best of my ability) that I was not missing something. There remains the very real possibility that I am still missing something. That said, I do believe that understanding the role that bank deposits play as the primary form of money is fundamental to any complete discussion of the questions of deposit insurance, deposit preference and moral hazard in banking.

Tony