APRA released a discussion paper in August 2018 titled “Improving the transparency, comparability and flexibility of the ADI capital framework” which offered two alternative paths.
- One (“Consistent Disclosure”) under which the status quo would be largely preserved but where APRA would get involved in the comparability process by adding its imprimatur to the “international harmonised ratios” that the large ADIs use to make the case for their strength compared to their international peers, and
- A second (“Capital Ratio Adjustments”) under which APRA would align its formal capital adequacy measure more closely with the internationally harmonised approach.
I covered those proposals in some detail here and came out in favour of the second option. I don’t imagine APRA pay much attention to my blog but in a speech delivered to the AFR Banking and Wealth Summit Wayne Byres flagged that APRA do in fact intend to pursue the second option.
The speech does not get into too much detail but it listed the following features the proposed new capital regime will exhibit:
– more risk-based – by adjusting risk weights in a range of areas, some up (e.g. for higher risk housing) and some down (e.g. for small business);
– more flexible – by changing the mix between minimum requirement and buffers, utilising more of the latter;
– more transparent – by better aligning with international minimum standards, and making the underlying strength of the Australian framework more visible;
– more comparable – by, in particular, making sure all banks disclose a capital ratio under the common, standardised approach; and
– more proportionate – by providing a simpler framework suitable for small banks with simple business models.
… while also making clear that
… probably the most fundamental change flowing from the proposals is that bank capital adequacy ratios will change. Specifically, they will tend to be higher. That is because the changes we are proposing will, in aggregate, reduce risk-weighted assets for the banking system. Given the amount of capital banks have will be unchanged, lower risk-weighted assets will produce higher capital ratios.
However, that does not mean banks will be able to hold less capital overall. I noted earlier that a key objective is to not increase capital requirements beyond the amount needed to meet the ‘unquestionably strong’ benchmarks. Nor is it our intention to reduce that amount. The balance will be maintained by requiring banks to hold larger buffers over their minimum requirements.
One observation at this stage …
It is hard to say too much at this stage given the level of detail released but I do want to make one observation. Wayne Byres listed four reasons for the changes proposed;
- To improve risk sensitivity
- To make the framework more flexible, especially in times of stress
- To make clearer the fundamental strength of our banking system vis-a-vis international peers
- To ensure that the unquestionably strong capital built up prior to the pandemic remains a lasting feature of the Australian banking system.
Pro-cyclicality remains an issue
With respect to increasing flexibility, Wayne Byres went on to state that “Holding a larger proportion of capital requirements in the form of capital buffers main that there is more buffer available to be utilised in times of crisis” (emphasis added).
It is true that the capital buffer will be larger in basis points terms by virtue of the RWA (denominator in the capital ratio) being reduced. However, it is also likely that the capital ratio will be much more sensitive to the impacts of a stress/crisis event.
This is mostly simple math.
- I assume that loan losses eating into capital are unchanged.
- It is less clear what happens to capital deductions (such as the CET1 deduction for Regulatory Expected Loss) but it is not obvious that they will be reduced.
- Risk Weights we are told will be lower and more risk sensitive.
- The lower starting value for RWA in any adverse scenario means that the losses (we assume unchanged) will translate into a larger decline in the capital ratio for any given level of stress.
- There is also the potential for the decline in capital ratios under stress to be accentuated (or amplified) to the extent the average risk weights increase in percentage terms more than they would under the current regime.
None of this is intended to suggest that APRA has made the wrong choice but I do believe that the statement that “more buffer” will be available is open to question. The glass is however most definitely half full. I am mostly flagging the fact that pro-cyclicality is a feature of any risk sensitive capital adequacy measure and I am unclear on whether the proposed regime will do anything to address this.
The direction that APRA has indicated it intends to take is the right one (I believe) but I think there is an opportunity to also address the problem of pro-cyclicality. I remain hopeful that the consultation paper to be released in a few weeks will shed more light on these issues.
Tony – From the Outside
p.s. the following posts on my blog touch on some of the issues that may need to be covered in the consultation
- The case for lower risk weights
- A non zero default for the counter cyclical capital buffer
- The interplay of proposed revisions to APS 111 and the RBNZ requirement that banks in NZ hold more CET1 capital
- Does expected loss loan provisioning reduce pro-cyclicality
- My thoughts on a cyclical capital buffer